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The policies are thought to have contributed to China's "economic miracle" and eightfold growth in gross national product over two decades. The term's definition is not agreed upon. Ramo has detailed it as a pragmatic policy that uses innovation and experimentation to achieve "equitable, peaceful high-quality growth", and "defense of national borders and interests",  whereas other scholars have used it to refer to "stable, if repressive, politics and high-speed economic growth".
The China Model is sometimes used interchangeably with the Beijing Consensus,  though there are people who insist "it is inaccurate to describe the Chinese model as the 'Beijing consensus' versus the ' Washington consensus '. Zhang Weiwei , Chinese professor of international relations from Fudan University , adds the following:. The model began to receive considerable attention following the severe economic downturn as Western economies faltered and recovered slowly while Chinese economic growth remained dynamic; comparisons began to portray the China Model or the "Beijing Consensus" as China's alternative to the "Washington Consensus" liberal-market approach.
As China's economic growth has continued, the China Model or the "Beijing Consensus" as a template has grown more popular around the world. The training includes sessions where China's successes in improving living standards are promoted.
Ramo was a former senior editor and foreign editor of Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates , the consulting firm of former U. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The first guideline involves a "commitment to innovation and constant experimentation.
Ramo argues that there is no perfect solution, and that the only true path to success is one that is dynamic, as no one plan works for every situation.
Rather, Ramo feels that the sustainability of the economic system and an even distribution of wealth, along with GDP , are important indicators of progress. The third guideline urges a policy of self-determination, where the less-developed nations use leverage to keep the superpowers in check and assure their own financial sovereignty.
This includes not only financial self-determination, but also a shift to the most effective military strategy, which Ramo suggests is more likely to be an asymmetric strategy rather than one that seeks direct confrontation.
Unlike the Washington Consensus, which largely ignored questions of geo-politics , Ramo argues—particularly in the Chinese context—that geo-politics and geo-economics are fundamentally linked. Yet he unveils more complexity to the China Model in his analysis. He concludes that, since these characteristics are unique to China, it is permissible to call it the China Model. This is common sense, plain and simple. The logic here is that the merit-driven arrangement would inevitably evolve from reliance on revolutionary credentials, for the first- generation leaders, to reliance on regime-building credentials, for later- generation leaders.
The genetics factor is gone, the patronage factor still helps, and the merit factor is of overwhelming importance. One critic of Ramo's plan is University of Oregon professor Arif Dirlik , a "notable specialist in Chinese and in intellectual history," who wrote the paper Beijing Consensus: Beijing "Gongshi.
Although Dirlik is intrigued by the concepts and philosophy of Ramo's Beijing Consensus, he says that Ramo's plan is a "Silicon Valley model of development" that ignores the fact that the exploitation of China's labor force by foreign countries was a major part of the Chinese development.
Halper argues that China's model of economic development without corresponding democratic reforms is serving as a template throughout the developing world. It is one that Beijing eagerly exports as demonstrated by its support of other illiberal regimes, such as those in Sudan , Angola , or Zimbabwe by offering developing countries "no-strings-attached gifts and loans", rather than "promoting democracy through economic aid", as does the West. He sees this as establishing a trend "Away from the market - democratic model—and toward a new type of capitalism , which can flourish without the values and norms of Western liberalism "  which could ultimately supplant the Washington consensus.
The China Model also extends to other fields besides the state structure and economics. Further, he observes that Chinese scholars seem to be not so critical and reflective on how Chinese traditions might play a role in IR; they rather draw ideas from other academic fields from history, culture, and philosophy, which might not be compatible with academic discipline of IR as it is positivist in nature.
Critics at the free-market oriented magazine The Economist have called the model "unclear" and an invention of "American think-tank eggheads" and "plumage-puffed Chinese academics". Many economic problems that we face are actually political problems in disguise, such as the nature of the economy, the nature of the ownership system in the country and groups of vested interests. The problems are so serious that they have to be solved now and can no longer be put off.
In , Zhang Weiying , professor at Peking University 's National School of Development, argued that China's economic development since was not due to a distinctive "China model". He added that, "From the western perspective, the 'China model' theory makes China into an alarming outlier, and must lead to conflict between China and the western world", adding that the tariffs and the trade war pursued by U.
Shen Hong of the Unirule Institute of Economics warned against abandoning Deng Xiaoping 's post neoliberal reforms in China , telling the Financial Times : "Without a doubt, reform and opening up eliminated the ideological conflict between China and the US, as well as the whole western world, and gradually brought convergence in terms of values". From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Part of a series on Economic systems By ideology.
By coordination. By regional model. Common ownership Private Public Voluntary. Property types. Collective ownership Commons Private property State ownership Social ownership. Other types. Communist Party. Top-ranked secretary : Wang Huning. Chairman : Xi Jinping. Vice-Chairmen :. Office Chief: Ding Xuexiang. Director: Xi Jinping.
Secretary-General: Wang Huning. Deputy Director: Li Keqiang. Office Chief: Liu He. United Front. Scientific Outlook on Development. Harmonious Socialist Society. Constitution Law. Constitution Previous constitutions President list : Xi Jinping. Presidential spouse : Peng Liyuan. Vice-President : Wang Qishan. Secretary-General : Xiao Jie. National Defense Mobilization Commission. Chairman : Li Keqiang.
Minister : Wei Fenghe. Judiciary Law enforcement. Secretary: Guo Shengkun. President : Zhou Qiang. Prosecutor General : Zhang Jun. Minister: Zhao Kezhi State Councilor. Minister: Chen Wenqing. Minister: Fu Zhenghua. Director: Wang Huning. Deputy Director: Huang Kunming. Head: Huang Kunming.
Deputy director: Li Keqiang. Director: Xu Lin. Hong Kong Macau. Cross-Strait relations. Foreign relations. Related topics. Administrative divisions Hukou system Family planning Ethnic minorities Communism.
Other countries. Duke University. Retrieved 28 January This paper represents a first-cut effort at operationalizing and measuring the so-called Beijing Consensus or China Model , a form of state capitalism which some see as an ideological alternative to the Washington Consensus and a challenge to American soft power.
May The Foreign Policy Centre. Archived from the original PDF on 24 August Student Pulse Academic Journal. The Diplomat. Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved January 28, University of Oregon. International Herald Tribune. It is inaccurate to describe the Chinese model as the "Beijing consensus" versus the "Washington consensus. The Economist. May 26, Retrieved October 30, The end of history and the last man. Retrieved
A new Beijing Consensus is emerging with new attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of power. Though it is often misunderstood as a nascent superpower, China has no intention of entering an arms race. Through fostering good international relations, it is safeguarding the peaceful environment needed to secure its prosperity, and deterring the attempts of some on the fringes of US politics to turn it into a pariah. Ramo argues that China offers hope to developing countries after the collapse of the Washington consensus.
The Beijing Consensus