Login via Institution. As such, it fails to reflect the basic principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to which Peru has committed. However, because the crc is subject to multiple interpretations, it also serves as a potential resource to counter repressive legislation such as the Begging Bill. The article is based on 14 months of field work in Peru and over interviews with policy makers, government officials, educators, and street children themselves, among others. Aitken S.
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Tampoco se puede dar por hecho que las consecuencias de la pandemia resulten ser total, o uniformemente, negativas para la paz y la seguridad. Esto, sin embargo, no es un gran consuelo. Este informe breve, el primero de una serie de publicaciones de Crisis Group sobre el COVID y sus efectos en el panorama de conflictos, se basa en los aportes de nuestros analistas en todo el mundo e identifica siete tendencias a tener presentes durante la pandemia.
Connolly y David L. Jamieson et al. La entrega de kits de pruebas esenciales se ha retrasado por semanas. Hide Footnote. Sin embargo, El Salvador y Guatemala suspendieron a mediados de marzo todos los vuelos entrantes de deportados centroamericanos desde EE.
La OMS y otros funcionarios internacionales temen que las restricciones asociadas con la enfermedad dificulten las cadenas humanitarias de suministro.
In a possible sign of progress, U. Crisis Group a su vez ha tenido que limitar severamente la capacidad de nuestros analistas para viajar durante la pandemia por su propia seguridad.
El 15 de marzo, las fuerzas de seguridad mataron a tres civiles. Ya se pueden ver los primeros signos de desorden social. En Ucrania, manifestantes atacaron buses que transportaban a evacuados ucranianos desde Wuhan, China, ante rumores de que algunos estaban contagiados.
Incluso precauciones razonables pueden provocar respuestas hostiles. De nuevo, ya hay ejemplos. Hide Footnote El momento actual, por lo tanto, se diferencia de otras crisis internacionales aun relativamente recientes.
En el , EE. Hide Footnote Hoy, EE. Es muy temprano para evaluar esas implicaciones. La magnitud del brote genera espacios para gestos humanitarios entre rivales. Si bien EE. Elected in November and without a majority in parliament, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa seized his earliest opportunity to dissolve the legislature on 2 March and schedule a general election for 25 April. With the constitution stating that parliament can remain dissolved for only three months pending fresh elections, Sri Lanka will head into dangerously uncharted territory unless the president or courts take decisive action before the deadline expires on 2 June.
In addition, several ad hoc emergency task forces appointed by the president two of which are headed by his unelected brother Basil Rajapaksa and a third by the army commander have largely ignored existing legislation for handling disasters. More importantly, the process of setting a new election date is in constitutional and practical disarray. Although the constitution is clear about the three-month limit, the NEC decided to postpone the vote until the virus is safely controlled, meaning that the 2 June deadline would have passed.
Foreseeing the constitutional dilemma ahead, the NEC had first asked the president to consult the Supreme Court for its opinion on how to proceed, but Rajapaksa refused. Under pressure from the government to hold the election as soon as possible, the NEC chose 20 June as the new date, ignoring arguments that conditions were still not safe enough for a free and fair election with full campaigning.
On 20 May, lawyers for the NEC told the Supreme Court that the election could not be held on the proposed date and that preparations for the vote would require nine to eleven weeks after health officials declare that conditions are safe. The earliest possible election date would thus fall in late July or early August. A separate legal problem emerged at the end of April, when the government exceeded the debt ceiling established by the temporary budget that parliament approved in October last year.
Based on publicly available information, the government appears to have little if any money remaining in its treasury, making new borrowing essential. Given the impossibility of installing a new parliament by 2 June, the easiest way to avoid a constitutional crisis would be for the president to use his powers to recall the previous parliament before the three-month time limit is reached.
In such a scenario, Rajapaksa would be able to dissolve the parliament again, ideally once it had approved a short-term budget and the health situation allowed elections to be conducted safely. Since his election in November , President Rajapaksa — whose brother, Mahinda, is prime minister and whose other brothers are in key positions — has given retired and active military officials an unprecedented role in governance. The Ministry of Defence has taken over a number of key civilian agencies and, at latest count, eighteen generals — most but not all retired — head or hold senior positions in civilian departments.
A significant number of them are members of the same Gajaba army regiment in which Gotabaya served during the s. The COVID crisis has also seen the military granted a larger policy role than ever before , with the army commander heading the national coronavirus task force and military personnel in charge of many aspects of disease control.
The new government has also taken direct political control of the police department and actively reversed previous tentative steps toward accountability for grave crimes committed by government forces during the civil war. Within days of taking office, the president ordered a shake-up of the police Criminal Investigation Department, demoting or transferring officers in charge of high-profile investigations of political crimes committed when his brother Mahinda was in power between and , and reappointing or promoting police and military intelligence personnel detained on suspicion of involvement in murders and abductions.
The authorities have also targeted Muslim activists: notably, they have detained a prominent Muslim lawyer, Hejaaz Hizbullah , on terrorism charges without presenting him in court or allowing him private access to his lawyer, thus flouting even the minimal safeguards of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act.
The government policy of mandating cremations for coronavirus victims — without medical justification and in the face of appeals by the UN and Muslim leaders inside and outside Sri Lanka to respect Muslim religious practices — has angered and frightened Muslims. Fearful of being hospitalised and forcibly cremated should they die, many are reportedly determined not to report their symptoms in case of illness. On 27 April, the parliamentary opposition called on the president to reconvene the dissolved assembly.
The president and ruling family are both eager to hold an election while their popularity is high, and before voters feel the worst impact of the looming economic crisis, but they are also determined to rule without parliament in the meantime. Ministers and government supporters buttress their refusal to allow the assembly to reconvene with the populist claim that the president, elected last year by a wide margin, has a stronger democratic mandate than the legislators, who were elected in January But what is most striking about the impending crisis is how unnecessary it is.
In this context, its apparent refusal to accept the modest constraints of parliamentary oversight seems to confirm widespread fears of an executive determined to rule without meaningful checks on its power.
Rajapaksa and his entourage have made clear since his election last year that one of their top priorities is to significantly strengthen presidential powers, which they argue were dangerously weakened by the 19 th amendment to the constitution, adopted almost unanimously by parliament in April With the clock ticking toward a constitutional crisis, opposition parties and civil society activists have turned to the Supreme Court.
According to this interpretation of the constitution, any election held after 2 June would be illegal unless parliament is first recalled and the constitutional clock reset. Lawyers for the president and his party, on the other hand, are trying to convince the court to dismiss the petitions on procedural grounds , accusing the petitioners of waiting too long to file the case and acting in bad faith, trying to avoid elections they would likely lose.
Constitutional regularity would be restored, and the president would retain the authority to dissolve the assembly as soon as it had approved a short-term budget and done other legal housekeeping.
Independence of the judiciary apart, such a verdict would, however, require significant courage from the court given the furious reaction it would likely provoke from the president. That would mark a dangerous break from Sri Lankan political tradition: even through forty years of insurgencies, civil war, emergency rule, grave human rights abuses and numerous abuses of executive power, no government has directly defied the Supreme Court or ruled without parliament.
Such a ruling would set a precedent in opening up legal space for executive power with no parliamentary oversight. A third, perhaps safer option for the court would be to try to split the difference, accepting on as-yet-unknown bases the legality of the president ruling without parliament, but limiting this arrangement to a specified period. Finally, the slow pace of hearings suggests that the court may choose another route entirely.
Despite the urgency, the judges have already spent more than a week on the preliminary step of deciding whether the petitions have strong enough grounds for the court to hear arguments leading to a judgment.
It appears increasingly likely that the 2 June deadline will pass without a court ruling, leaving a constitutional breach as a fait accompli the court could have great difficulty repairing. Critics would be especially vocal if the elections were held at a time when virus-related health restrictions limited the ability to campaign freely.
Although immediate violent resistance is unlikely, the longer-term damage from forcing through an election on unconstitutional terms and in unsafe conditions could be considerable. Sri Lanka has suffered its worst periods of political violence precisely when the door to change through elections and non-violent protest has appeared closed — whether for Tamil youth in the s or Sinhalese youth in the s. It is essential to avoid the door closing again.
The current political impasse has deep roots that are not easily amenable to outside influence, and the Rajapaksa government is particularly resistant to international advice or pressure. The government has also rebuffed multiple requests from UN officials and from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and its member states to change its mandatory COVID cremation policy and to better protect Muslims from hate speech and violence.
That leverage should be even stronger now that the government has lost its legal authority to borrow additional monies. Indeed, international financial institutions and their member governments may have a fiduciary responsibility not to loan money to a government that has no legal power to borrow. They also have a moral responsibility to use their leverage to help maintain, rather than undermine, political stability and the rule of law.
Helping finance extra-constitutional rule in Colombo risks sending all the wrong signals and setting a precedent not only in Sri Lanka but elsewhere, too. For these reasons, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank should all convey to the government that they are reviewing approval of additional loans until the gap in government authority to borrow and appropriate money is closed.
Contributing governments to these institutions should make clear to the Rajapaksa administration that they will not be able to offer, or vote in favour of, further loans so long as parliament has not made this possible through a properly approved budget and an increase in the debt ceiling.
To prevent any undue economic harm to average Sri Lankans, other forms of development assistance — including urgently needed help to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus — and trade would continue unchanged. The temporary pause in international lending would not be about punishing Sri Lanka, but rather about protecting its own rules, and the integrity of international lending institutions, from being abused. Worries that taking such action would only make Sri Lanka more dependent on China, and more likely to copy its governance style, are overblown.
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